There are at least three groups of influence in the “Sluha Narodu” faction which shape Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s policy on conflict settlement in Donbas. Kolomoiskyi’s group, group “Kvartal” and Avakov’s group seek to use Zelenskyi’s peaceful intentions in serving own political and business interests. Depending on balance of power in the ruling party and influence of external players, developments around Donbas may unfold according to three scenarios: accelerated implementation of the Minsk agreements, progress in humanitarian sphere without political progress, and continuation of a low-intensity conflict.
Over the last weeks, contradictions in the ruling party “Sluha Narodu” have been revealed in many spheres of state policy, including conflict settlement in Donbas. There are at least three groups of influence which have different vision of conflict settlement, guided by own political and business interests.
- Kolomoiskyi’s group. This group includes Head of the President’s Office Andrii Bohdan, chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign policy Bohdan Yaremenko and other associates of Ihor Kolomoiskyi who try to use peaceful intentions of Volodymyr Zelenskyi in strengthening their positions. This group is interested in the return of financial assets which have been nationalized in the Russian territory after 2014, an access to cheap Russian and coal from ORDLO, as well as in the re-privatization of PrivatBank. Consequently, Kolomoisky’s group stands for stepped up normalization of relations with Russia which requires a priority solution to the Donbas issue. They insist on elections in ORDLO to be held in 2020 simultaneously with local elections in other Ukrainian regions and broad decentralization without enshrining a special status for ORDLO in the Constitution of Ukraine. They attempt to persuade Russia that such decentralization model will grant more rights to Donbas than a special status specified in the Minsk agreements. Moreover, Kolomoiskyi’s allies rely on Russia’s financial assistance in the reconstruction of Donbas which may relieve a financial burden on Ukrainian budget and decrease Ukraine’s dependence on loans from the IMF, the EU and the U.S.
- Group “Kvartal”. This group includes president’s assistant on international issues Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyi’s long-time media partner Tymur Mindych, assistant to the RNBO Secretary on Donbas Serhiy Syvokho and other close friends of the president. They support Zelenskyi’s peace steps which help preserve his popularity in the Ukrainian society. Zelenskyi’s inner circle relies that president’s success in peaceful settlement will solidify their standing in relations with political and business heavyweights, first and foremost with Ihor Kolomoiskyi. This group stands for new prisoner exchanges, establishment of comprehensive ceasefire, disengagement of troops along the whole contact line, and facilitation of movement across the contact line for residents of ORDLO. Meanwhile, Zelenskyi’s inner circle avoids discussions about a special status, elections in ORDLO and other unpopular measures which Russia demands.
- Avakov’s group. This group includes Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Anton Herashchenko, leader of the parliamentary faction “Sluha Narodu” Davyd Arakhamia and chairman of the parliamentary committee on law enforcement Denys Monastyrskyi. Arsen Avakov seeks to maintain his political influence by means of control over security agencies (the police, the National Guard) and a variety of nationalist organizations (first of all, the National Corps) which are hostile to the “Steinmeier formula”, the disengagement of forces and other peace steps taken by Volodymyr Zelenskyi. This group is critical about the implementation of the Minsk agreements and stands for the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission in Donbas with a broad mandate. Avakov tries to convince Zelenskyi that it is necessary not to rush into conflict settlement until Ukraine’s international standings becomes more favourable.
Over the nearest months, it will be clear under which scenario developments around Donbas will unfold. It will depend on both balance of power in the “Sluha Narodu” and influence of external players (Russia, Germany, France, the U.S.).
Scenario 1: Accelerated implementation of the Minsk agreements. This scenario provides that Ukraine agrees to adopt a new law on the special status of ORDLO and the conduct of elections on Russia’s terms in exchange of the prisoner swap and the establishment of lasting ceasefire.
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Scenario 2: Progress in humanitarian sphere without political progress. Under this scenario, Ukraine tries to as much as possible improve conditions of citizens who suffer from the armed conflict without implementing unpopular provisions of the Minsk agreements.
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Scenario 3: Continuation of a low-intensity conflict. This scenario provides for slowdown in peace process if Ukraine does not manage to compromise with Russia on acceptable terms.
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